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ABSTRACT 
 
Hedge funds are considered to be market-neutral due to their unrestricted investment flexibility 
and more efficient market timing abilities (Ennis & Sebastian, 2003). They may also be considered 
as suitably unconventional assets for improving portfolio diversification (Lamm, 1999). The 
evidence from this study confirms the dominance of hedge funds over the CAC 40, DAX, S&P 500 
and Dow Jones from 2004 to 2011. Overall, the Sharpe, Sortino, Omega, Jensen’s alpha, Treynor 
and Calmar ratios illustrate that US hedge funds outperformed both EU hedge funds and the 
associated equity markets over this period. Evidence was also found that both US and EU hedge 
funds were more correlated with the S&P 500 and Dow Jones after the financial crisis of 2007-
2009 than before the crisis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
edge funds are defined as pooled investment vehicles that embody a variation of different investment 
strategies, which can include short and long positions, leveraged positions, and derivate positions to 
limit market exposure and to increase risk-adjusted returns (Amin & Kat, 2003; National Treasury, 
2012). With no investment constraints, a hedge fund manager is capable of investing in any global market to 
maximise a fund’s financial gains (Kanellakos, 2005). This implies that the different investment strategies available 
can satisfy a variation of investors with different risk preferences (Shin, 2012). As such, hedge funds are considered 
unconventional assets that contribute to a higher reward level, which can serve as a substitute for cash and bonds 
during a declining equity market (Lamm, 1999). 
 
However, the certainty of performance persistence has been diluted by the many conflicting results found 
by past studies. On the one hand the proponents of hedge funds argue that their low correlation with the returns on 
traditional alternative assets, like currencies, bonds, mutual funds and other equities, therefore, make them a better 
risk-return trade-off vehicle (Fung & Hsieh, 1997; Lavino, 2000; Amin & Kat, 2003; Al-Sharkas, 2005). This low 
correlation with the rest of the asset universe is further enhanced because of their exemption from the Company Act 
of 1940 and from the Security Exchange Act of 1934, providing them greater flexibility regarding different 
investment options. 
 
It is also argued that hedge funds generate positive alphas, which implies that hedge fund managers as a 
group have an investment ability and may possess private information that is unavailable to other investors (Li, 
2006), thus emphasising the potential dominance of hedge funds. Also, with the possibility of implementing 
features, like lock up periods, redemption frequencies and notices, share restrictions and minimum investment 
H 
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amounts, hedge funds can produce higher alphas as they earn an illiquidity premium (see Agarwal, Daniel & Naik, 
2009; Li, 2006; Aragon, 2007). These arguments, therefore, suggest that with a higher level of illiquidity and 
investment flexibility hedge funds should be able to ensure performance persistence and dominance over other types 
of investment options. This is also emphasised by Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) and Liang (1999) 
who found that hedge funds have the consistency of providing superior returns with higher volatility, due to their 
more active management approach, compared to the more passive managed mutual funds. 
 
Studies conducted by McCarthy and Spurgin (1998) and Schneeweis and Spurgin (1998) also concluded 
that hedge funds can offer greater risk-adjusted returns than alternative investment options, thus incorporating a 
lower level of systematic risk (Brown, Goetzmann & Ibbotson, 1999; Liang, 1999). This is mainly possible because 
of their investment flexibility, their ability to hedge themselves in bear markets (Nicholas, 2004), as well as their 
superior market timing (Ennis & Sebastian, 2003). 
 
There are also a number of other studies that argue for the superiority of hedge funds over other investment 
vehicles. Studies done by Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999), Edwards and Caglayan (2001a), Fung and 
Hsieh (2004) and Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2007) for example all found performance persistence in hedge funds. 
There are also those studies that found performance persistence to vary based on the market environment and 
differences in investment strategies (see for example Fung & Hsieh, 1997). Corroborating these findings, the study 
by Capocci, Corhay and Hübner (2005) reports evidence of yearly-based persistence in mid-performed particular 
hedge fund portfolios during bullish periods, while Duong (2008) found stronger performance persistence when 
monthly, quarterly or semi-annual returns are used instead of annual return data. Further evidence even suggested 
that performance persistence might decrease over a longer period (Agawal & Naik, 2000). 
 
On the opposite side of the argument, evidence also abounds that performance persistence does not 
manifest at all among hedge funds. Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999) and Schneeweis, Kazemi and Martin 
(2001), for example found no evidence of performance persistence for hedge funds. Edwards and Caglayan (2001b) 
also found that hedge funds are highly correlated with an equity market during a bear market, implying a downturn 
in returns during a downswing in the equity market. The main reason for the uncertainty regarding performance 
persistence of hedge funds, however, mainly stems from the high attrition rate among hedge funds (see Brown, 
Goetzmann, Ibbotson & Ross, 1992; Fung & Hsieh, 1997; Ackermann, McEnally & Ravenscraft 1999; Liang, 2000; 
Li, 2006). This implies that there is a relative high tendency for a significant number of hedge funds to close over a 
certain time period. Some of the reasons for the high attrition rate can be attributed to voluntary dropouts or due to 
poor performance, but not because hedge funds are associated as defunct funds (Li, 2006). Though, Amin and Kat 
(2003) argue that the aggressive attitude of hedge fund managers may be a significant factor that contributes to a 
high attrition rate. 
 
Given the contrasting results above, it is difficult to assess whether hedge funds are indeed superior 
investment vehicles. Overall, hedge funds employ highly skilled managers (Shin, 2012), and are excluded from the 
regulations governing public issuance of securities (Duong, 2008), which allows them to employ a myriad of 
techniques that allow them to outperform ‘normal’ investment vehicles. 
 
This study will, evaluate both United States (US) and European (EU) hedge funds over three different 
periods to establish performance dominance during different market trends. The performance of these hedge funds 
will be evaluated by employing the Sharpe ratio, Sortino ratio, Treynor ratio, Jensen’s alpha, Calmar ratio, Omega 
ratio and an Exponential-Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) model. These hedge fund’s performances will be 
measured over the pre-financial crisis, financial crisis and post-financial crisis periods, respectively, in order to 
establish if the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis, which originated in the US, and the current (2012) debt crisis in the EU 
have influenced performance dominance. Furthermore, by evaluating these hedge funds against the DAX, CAC 40, 
S&P 500 and the Dow Jones, it is possible to establish whether hedge funds outperformed associated equity markets 
and if a normal buy-and-hold-strategy on these equity markets were the better option than to invest in a US or EU 
hedge fund. In order to achieve these objectives this paper will commence by discussing the most dominant risk-
adjusted performance measures as emphasised by past studies (Section 2). The empirical results will then be 
reported in Section 3, followed by the concluding remarks and recommendations in Section 4. 
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2. RISK-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
 
The Sharpe ratio remains one of the most commonly used statistics in financial analysis. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that market participants – whether investors or fund managers – still employ the Sharpe ratio as the 
performance measure of choice (see for example Lo, 2002; Bailey & López de Prado, 2012, p. 3; Schuster & Auer, 
2012; Auer & Schuhmacher, 2013). Before Sharpe formulated his famous ratio, Jack Treynor developed the Treynor 
ratio in 1965. This ratio is identical to the ratio Sharpe developed in 1966, but differs with respect of the risk 
measure used. The Treynor ratio can be expressed as (adapted from Treynor, 1965): 
 
Treynor ratio  
     
  
 (1) 
 
where    denotes the return of a portfolio or security;    denotes the risk-free rate; and    is utilised as risk metric, 
thus incorporating market risk. Sharpe’s ratio veers away from market risk, only considering the volatility of the 
portfolio around its own mean as a risk measure. The Sharpe ratio can thus be expressed as (adapted from Sharpe, 
1966): 
 
Sharpe ratio  
     
  
 (2) 
 
where    is the standard deviation of portfolio returns. Sharpe’s ratio thus allows for the measurement of the risk 
premium of the portfolio, for every unit of risk assumed. Therefore, it is obvious that, like with Treynor’s ratio, the 
portfolio with the greater Sharpe value will be the best performing portfolio on a risk-adjusted basis. However, 
although these two measures are so alike, they do not always render similar results. It is thus possible for a portfolio 
with a relatively large unique risk to outperform the market when looking at the Treynor’s ratio, but underperform 
the market when using Sharpe’s ratio (Deb, 2012). 
 
Despite the Sharpe ratio’s popularity, there are still some pitfalls to consider when applying it as 
performance measure in cases where its underlying assumptions are breached (Auer & Schuhmacher, 2013, p. 154; 
Schuster & Auer, 2012, p. 124). As such the Sharpe ratio generally fares better in ranking the performance of less 
volatile returns (such as that of mutual funds), but poorer when highly volatile returns are gauged (Lo, 2002, p. 36). 
Since hedge funds make use of derivative instruments, their returns often follow an asymmetrical distribution with 
fat tails (thus a non-normal distribution), thus reducing the Sharpe ratio’s ability to handle these returns (Fung & 
Hsieh, 1999a; Eling, 2008). In such circumstances, the Sharpe ratio tends to overestimate true risk (Brooks & Kat, 
2002). This leaves market participants, with a skewed perception of the real risk inherent in hedge funds. 
 
It is, therefore, necessary to look wider than the standard Sharpe ratio when comparing hedge fund 
performance with anything. To this end, several studies have included a variety of measures to gauge the 
performance of hedge funds. Gregoriou and Rouah (2002), for example employed both the Sharpe ratio and the 
Treynor ratio while Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999) used the Sharpe ratio and Jensen’s alpha. In their paper 
on the influence of different performance measures on the evaluation of hedge funds, Eling and Schuhmacher (2007) 
employed thirteen different performance measures, and reported that the rankings according to the Sharpe ratio and 
the other performance measures were very similar.
1
 Eling (2008) also went on to test the performance rankings of a 
wider population of asset classes including stocks, bonds, real estate, hedge funds, funds of hedge funds, 
Commodity Pool Operators (CPOs) and Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs) by employing eleven performance 
measures including the Sharpe ratio.
2
 Moreover, there have also been studies, like Sedzro (2009), who have 
consulted not only the Sharpe ratio and Modified Sharpe ratio, but have used additional statistical models, like the 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method and the Stochastic Dominance (SD) method, to generate performance 
rankings. 
                                                          
1 Eling and Schuhmacher (2007) employed the standard Sharpe ratio, the modified Sharpe ratio, the Treynor ratio, Jensen’s alpha, the Sortino 
ratio, Kappa 3, the upside potential ratio, the Calmar ratio, the Sterling ratio, the Burke ratio, the excess return on value at risk, the conditional 
Sharpe ratio and Omega. 
2 Eling (2008) employed the modified Sharpe ratio, the Sortino ratio, Kappa 3, the upside potential ratio, the Calmar ratio, the Sterling ratio, the 
Burke ratio, the excess return on value at risk, the conditional Sharpe ratio and Omega against the Sharpe ratio as a benchmark. 
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In order to measure the impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis on hedge funds a combination of ratios 
used by Eling and Schuhmacher (2007), Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999), as well as Gregoriou and Rouah 
(2002) were chosen. These ratios were selected to rank the sample of hedge fund and market index returns in order 
to escape some of the shortcomings of using only Sharpe in modelling volatile returns. Also, to extent the risk 
perception and the shortcomings of the Sharpe and Treynor ratio additional ratios were also employed. 
 
2.1 Measures other than Sharpe and Treynor 
 
Where Treynor and Sharpe’s indexes provide measures for ranking the relative performances of various 
portfolios on a risk-adjusted basis, Jensen (1968) attempted to construct a measure of absolute performance on a 
risk-adjusted basis, i.e., a definite standard against which performances of various portfolios can be measured. This 
standard is based on measuring the ‘portfolio manager’s predictive ability’ (the ability to earn returns through 
successful prediction of security prices), which are higher than those expected, given the level of riskiness of his 
portfolio, the expectation being based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
 
This is an attempt to determine if returns, more than that expected based on CAPM, are being earned for 
the portfolio’s riskiness. A simplified version of his basic model is given by (adapted from Jensen, 1968): 
 
                    (3) 
 
where    is the average portfolio return for the period concerned;    is the risk-free rate for the same period;    is 
the average market return or the return of the index for the portfolio concerned for the same period; and    is the 
Jensen’s Alpha. 
 
The    based on CAPM, on average, should be zero in the long-run, indicating neutral performance by a 
portfolio, i.e., the portfolio has done just as well as an unmanaged market portfolio or a large, randomly selected 
portfolio manager with a naive buy-and-hold strategy. A positive value of    represents a superior performance on 
the part of the portfolio manager. On the other hand, a negative value of    indicates inferior management 
performance, because management did not do as well as an unmanaged portfolio of equal systematic risk. 
 
The Sortino ratio differs from Sharpe in another way: it applies downside deviation as denominator instead 
of overall standard deviation. It, therefore, only considers "bad" volatility (Sortino & Van der Meer, 1991, p. 29), 
thus solving for the asymmetric characteristics of the return distribution of hedge funds, as is clear in Equation 4 
below (adapted from Eling & Schuhmacher, 2007): 
 
Sortino ratio 
  
    
         
  (4) 
 
where    is the risk free rate and the Lower Partial Moment (LPM) can be written as: 
 
         
 
 
             
  
    (5) 
 
The Sortino ratio’s ability to capture downside risk lays in the fact that it uses a LPM of the second order 
(thus      ) to capture the semi-variance of returns. Since LPMs only consider negative deviations from a minimal 
acceptable return (normally a risk free rate), it trumps standard deviation that captures both positive and negative 
deviations of expected returns. The other ratio used that employs LPMs is Omega. 
 
Omega does not only capture LPMs, but also Higher Partial Moments (HPMs), thus taking the positive 
deviations of expected returns above a minimal acceptable returns into consideration. In doing this, Omega provides 
a risk-reward evaluation that incorporates both the beneficial impact of gains and the unfavourable effect of losses, 
relative to any investor’s threshold (Shadwick & Keating, 2002). The ability of Omega to capture both sides of the 
‘Partial Moment coin’ is visible from Equation 6 below (Eling & Schuhmacher, 2007): 
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Omega  
  
   
        
   (6) 
 
where the LPM can once again be written as: 
 
         
 
 
             
  
    (7) 
 
In this case the LPM of the order is observed. It should be clear from Equation 6 that Omega allows the 
user to specify the level of return against which a given outcome will be considered a profit or a loss, and is thus in 
essence a probability weighted ratio of profits to losses relative to a return threshold (Bertrand & Prigent, 2011). 
 
The other measure employed that uses LPMs in the form of a maximum drawdown is the Calmar ratio. 
This ratio allows the user to express excess returns as a function of the maximum cumulative loss between a peak 
and a following bottom. The Calmar ratio can, therefore, be easily expressed as follows (adapted from Eling, 2008): 
 
Calmar ratio  
     
   
 (8) 
 
where    is the average portfolio return for the period concerned;    is the risk-free rate for the same period, and 
    is the maximum drawdown. Although Magdon-Ismail and Atiya (2004) cautions against the use of the Calmar 
ratio in the form above, this issue is not applicable in our case since all comparisons are done over the same time 
frames.
3
 
 
The final performance measure to be used is the EWMA model of JP Morgan. This model can provide 
substantial assistance in portfolio allocation and performance, even outperforming multivariate Generalised 
AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models (Giamouridis & Vrontos, 2007). This model can 
be illustrated as follows (J.P. Morgan/Reuters, 1996):  
 
                     
 
    (9) 
 
where the EWMA model depends on the decay factor,          , which determines the relative weights that 
must be applied to returns. In estimating the decay factor the following steps must be followed (J.P. 
Morgan/Reuters, 1996): 
 
Firstly,   must be calculated. This can be achieved by taking the sum of all   minimal Root-Mean-Square-
Errors (RMSE),  ’s: 
 
     
 
   
 (10) 
 
where 
 
 MSE  
 
 
      
           
  
 
 
   
 
 
Then, the relative error measure must be defined as follows: 
 
   
  
   
       
 (11) 
                                                          
3 Magdon-Ismail and Atiya (2004) introduced a normalised Calmar ratio in order to circumvent the issue of comparing Calmar ratios over 
different periods.  
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Once the relative error measure is defined, the weight should be defined as follows: 
 
   
  
  
   
       
 (12) 
 
where 
 
      
 
   
 
 
Finally, the optimal decay factor    can be defined as: 
 
          
 
   
 (13) 
 
where the final optimal decay factor applied is the weighted average of individual optimal decay factors. 
 
3. DATA AND RESULTS 
 
The time series under investigation will be structured to incorporate two aspects that can affect hedge fund 
performance. Firstly, the data series were divided into three periods, where two of these periods incorporated a 
bullish phase and one incorporated a bearish phase. This approach was motivated by two previous studies. Although 
there is evidence that hedge funds are highly correlated with equity markets during a bearish phase (Edwards & 
Caglayan, 2001b), the studies of Ennis and Sebastian (2003) and Nicholas (2004) found evidence that hedge funds 
will outperform other markets during a bearish phase. Secondly, the empirical study will evaluate hedge fund 
performance in different financial environments. To accomplish this goal the three time periods were also chosen to 
incorporate a pre-financial crisis period, a during financial crisis period, and a post-financial crisis period, as 
illustrated by Figure 1. 
 
The pre-financial crisis period (Period 1) spanned from January 2004 to December 2006, whereas the crisis 
period itself (Period 2) spanned from January 2007 to December 2009. The crisis period was selected to incorporate 
key events of the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis to ensure that the effect of the crisis can be evaluated effectively. 
Starting by incorporating the date when the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) announced 
that no more risky subprime mortgages and mortgage-related securities will be bought (27 February 2007), the 
takeover of Northern Rock by the UK Treasury (17 February 2008), and the announcements of Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Incorporated filing for bankruptcy on 15 September 2008. It also incorporates the announcement that 
President Obama would sign the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which included a variety of tax 
cuts and spending measures that were intended to promote economic recovery. All these events had a significant 
effect on global financial markets, which will make it ideal to investigate the superiority of hedge funds’ investment 
flexibility. Finally, the post-financial crisis period stretches from January 2010 to December 2011, which will help 
to evaluate the performance of the US and EU hedge funds during the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
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Figure 1:  Sample Period Under Investigation – Illustrated by the S&P 500 Index 
Source: Data were collected from Yahoo Finance (2013). 
 
This study examines 38 prominent EU hedge funds and 84 US hedge funds. The performance of these 
hedge funds was estimated using monthly returns obtained from the Eurekahedge (2012) database. In order to 
determine whether the US or EU hedge funds outperformed associated equity markets, monthly return data were 
also obtained from Yahoo Finance (2012) for CAC 40, DAX, S&P 500 and for Dow Jones. Also, the 90-day US 
Treasury Bill rate (constant maturity) and the Euro area bond yield were chosen as the US and EU risk-free rates, 
respectively. To ensure that the rankings were comparable all the ratios were calculated with both the US and EU 
risk-free rates for all the hedge funds and indices, respectively. The 90-day US Treasury Bill rate series was 
obtained from the Board of the Federal  eserve System’s (2012) website and the Euro area bond yield series was 
obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2012) database, respectively. 
 
To commence with the empirical results, it is imperative to firstly evaluate the descriptive statistics of each 
return series. Based on the study of Amin and Kat (2003), some return distributions tend to be non-linear and non-
normally distributed, which will limit the performance ranking abilities of traditional performance ratios, like 
Jensen’s alpha and the Sharpe ratio (Amin & Kat, 2003). This is especially true, if the divergence from normality 
becomes more apparent when the higher moments (kurtosis and skewness) of the return distributions are taken into 
account (Kat, 2003). Furthermore, very different portfolio allocations are possible, with the presence of non-normal 
returns, when comparing the traditional mean-variance framework to more advanced performance measures (see for 
example Fung & Hsieh, 1999a; Cvitanić, Lazrak, Martellini & Zapatero, 2003; McFall Lamm, 2003; Terhaar, Staub 
& Singer, 2003; Popova, Morton & Popova, 2003; Wong, Phoon & Lean, 2008). From the results reported in Table 
1, it is plausible that non-normality will be present and there is a possibility of dissimilarities between performance 
rankings. The results in Table 1 reveal that both the EU and US hedge fund returns are leptokurtic, except for the EU 
hedge funds during the post-financial crisis period that illustrated a platykurtic distribution. These results justify the 
findings of Fung and Hsieh (1999b), who argued that hedge fund returns are known to be leptokurtic. Also, the 
world indices exhibit inconsistency during all three time periods, except for the CAC 40, who display a platykurtic 
distribution throughout all three time periods. Furthermore, all the returns series have a negative skewness, which 
imply the possibility of a downside surprise (see for example McFall Lamm, 2003), except for the US hedge funds, 
which have a positive skewness during the post-financial crisis period. 
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics of the Returns of the Hedge Fund and World Indices 
Descriptive Statistics of Hedge Funds 
Averages 
EU Hedge Funds 
Mean Median Max. Min. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
Pre-financial crisis period 0.011 0.013 0.060 -0.046 0.024 -0.315 3.334 3.498** 
During financial crisis period 0.002 0.004 0.091 -0.087 0.038 -0.089 4.174 13.401** 
Post-financial crisis period -0.001 -0.002 0.057 -0.069 0.032 -0.152 2.849 1.240** 
Averages 
US Hedge Funds 
Mean Median Max. Min. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
Pre-financial crisis period 0.008 0.009 0.067 -0.055 0.028 -0.200 3.423 4.580** 
During financial crisis period 0.004 0.008 0.111 -0.130 0.050 -0.469 4.160 11.000** 
Post-financial crisis period 0.003 0.003 0.101 -0.08 0.044 0.034 3.441 9.007** 
Descriptive Statistics of World Indices 
 Averages 
CAC 40 
Mean Median Max. Min. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
Pre-financial crisis period 0.013 0.017 0.053 -0.05 0.026 -0.590 2.859 2.117** 
During financial crisis period -0.008 -0.009 0.126 -0.135 0.061 -0.270 2.768 0.518** 
Post-financial crisis period -0.008 -0.013 0.087 -0.113 0.056 -0.015 1.992 1.018** 
Averages 
DAX 
Mean Median Max. Min. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
Pre-financial crisis period 0.015 0.023 0.066 -0.053 0.031 -0.443 2.315 1.880** 
During financial crisis period 0.000 0.018 0.168 -0.151 0.069 -0.284 3.156 0.520** 
Post-financial crisis period 0.001 -0.001 0.116 -0.192 0.061 -0.899 5.577 9.875* 
Averages 
S&P 500 
Mean Median Max. Min. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
Pre-financial crisis period 0.007 0.011 0.037 -0.036 0.020 -0.443 2.296 1.921** 
During financial crisis period -0.008 0.009 0.086 -0.204 0.061 -1.077 4.307 9.519* 
Post-financial crisis period 0.003 -0.001 0.097 -0.089 0.050 -0.041 2.262 0.551** 
Averages 
DOW JONES 
Mean Median Max. Min. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
Pre-financial crisis period 0.005 0.006 0.038 -0.031 0.021 -0.091 1.853 2.024** 
During financial crisis period -0.006 0.001 0.079 -0.164 0.056 -0.932 3.711 5.972* 
Post-financial crisis period 0.005 0.008 0.087 -0.086 0.044 -0.094 2.324 0.493** 
** The null-hypothesis of a normal distribution is not rejected at a 5% confidence level. * The null-hypothesis of a normal distribution is rejected 
at a 5% confidence level. +Note: All the return series are also stationary at I(0), with both Augmented Dickey-Fuller functions including only an 
intercept and a trend and intercept, respectively. Source: Compiled by authors. 
 
From these findings it can be argued that most of the return series ought to possess a non-normal 
distribution profile, however based on the average Jarque-Bera estimates, all the hedge funds are normally 
distributed. This is, however, a misperception created by looking at the averages only; in reality several of the US 
and EU hedge funds exhibited a non-normal distribution when looking at the individual funds. During the pre-
financial crisis period six EU hedge funds and 22 US hedge funds are not normally distributed, whereas 10 EU 
hedge funds and 30 US hedge funds are not normally distributed during the crisis period. During the post-financial 
crisis period, this number decreased to only one EU hedge fund and thirteen US hedge funds not being normally 
distributed. 
 
The DAX exhibits a non-normal distribution during the post-financial crisis period and the S&P 500 and 
Dow Jones exhibit a non-normal distribution during the crisis period. The CAC 40, on the other hand, had a normal 
distribution throughout all three periods. Furthermore, it can be argued that although the standard deviation of all 
these returns is relatively low, the presence of non-normality will lead to a misperception of the actual risk present. 
This is due to the high kurtosis and negative skewness which will cause the variance and standard deviation to 
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mimic a low overall risk, causing traditional performance measures, like the Sharpe ratio, to generate bias 
performance rankings (see for example Bernardo & Ledoit, 2000; McFall Lamm, 2003). Also, with the 
inconsistencies between normal and non-normal distributions, these performance measures will provide different 
rankings, which is inconsistent with the findings of Pfingsten, Wagner and Wolferink (2004), Pedersen and 
Rudholm-Alfvin (2003) and of Eling and Schuhmacher (2007), who found strong correlation between their 
rankings. This study will, therefore, make use of the Omega ratio as the main benchmark, to determine if the 
presence of non-normality have influenced the rankings of each performance measure. This approach is based on the 
fact that the Omega ratio treats upside and downside risk differently, thus heeding the criticism of the mean-variance 
portfolio optimisation of Markowitz (Gilli, Schumann, Di Tollo & Cabej, 2011, p. 95). The Omega ratio also 
includes information over the entire distribution encoded in the first four moments (Togher & Barsbay, 2007); it 
does not require any assumptions about any moments (De Wet, Krige & Smit, 2008); and thus no assumptions are 
required on the utility function of an investor (Favre-Bulle & Pache, 2003). 
 
The second step of the empirical study will be to determine the level of correlation between the hedge 
funds, where the presence of correlation can cause the Sharpe ratio to generate bias performance rankings. This is 
based on Sharpe (1994) who argued that the Sharpe ratio assumes that individual securities are uncorrelated with the 
mean portfolio return. The results of Tables A through C in the appendix exhibit the presence of a moderate 
correlation level between the US and EU hedge funds. Although the overall correlation is positive, a few funds 
display a negative average correlation throughout the three time periods under investigation. Also, a small increase 
in average correlation was present among the hedge funds, although most hedge funds exhibit a decrease in average 
correlation during the post-financial crisis period to approximately the same level as the pre-financial crisis period. 
These findings reported in Tables A through C, therefore, further emphasise the possibility that the Sharpe ratio will 
generate bias performance rankings, due to the presence of correlation between the US and EU hedge funds. This 
implies that these rankings must be interpreted with extreme caution and must be benchmarked with the Omega ratio 
to ensure a more unbiased ranking. 
 
Table 2:  The Average Correlation between Hedge Funds and Equity Markets 
 Pre-Financial Crisis Period During Financial Crisis Period Post-Financial Crisis Period 
Hedge 
Funds 
CAC 
40 
DAX 
S&P 
500 
Dow 
Jones 
CAC 
40 
DAX 
S&P 
500 
Dow 
Jones 
CAC 
40 
DAX 
S&P 
500 
Dow 
Jones 
EU 0.577 0.533 0.408 0.340 0.554 0.524 0.493 0.444 0.481 0.461 0.509 0.488 
US 0.389 0.428 0.498 0.407 0.571 0.576 0.572 0.510 0.608 0.562 0.689 0.667 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
 
The results in Table 2 indicate that most EU hedge funds showed a relative constant average correlation 
with the different world equity markets, with an increase in this correlation over the three time periods. This 
illustrates a higher dependence on equities, especially with the S&P 500 and Dow Jones. Although it was to be 
expected that the average correlation should increase during the financial crisis period and stabilise afterwards, the 
results displayed a continuation in this trend. 
 
The US and EU hedge funds also exhibit a higher level of average correlation between S&P 500 and Dow 
Jones during the post-financial crisis period, which may be due to a lower level of anticipated risk (volatility) in 
these markets. These results do, therefore, not conclusively prove that US and EU hedge funds are more correlated 
with equity markets during bullish or bearish phases, which contradict the results found by Edwards and Caglayan 
(2001b). This implies that hedge funds may still have the ability to outperform equity markets during both a bearish 
and/or bullish phase, which will be established by the results found with the estimation of the different performance 
measures later on (see Tables 4 and 6). 
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Table 3:  The Level of Volatility between the Hedge Funds and Equity Markets 
Percentage of Hedge Funds Under the Top 10 Ranking for Highest Volatility 
  Pre-Crisis Period During Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
EU Hedge Funds 20% 0% 0% 
US Hedge Funds 80% 100% 100% 
Ranking of Indices:  A Ranking Closer to One is Associated with a Higher Level of Volatility (Risk) 
 
Pre-Crisis Period During Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
CAC 40 53 25 22 
DAX 35 18 11 
S&P 500 92 29 41 
Dow Jones 97 34 55 
+ Note that the upper part of this table provides a summary of how many of the 84 US hedge funds, the 38 EU hedge funds and 4 world indices (a 
total of 126) ranked under the top 10 best performing entities. The bottom part of this table illustrates the rankings of the different equity indices 
from a total of 126, respectively. Source: Compiled by authors. 
 
The third step of the empirical study will be to determine the level of volatility over the three different 
financial environment periods, which will be determined by estimating an Exponential Weighted Moving Average 
(EWMA) model. From Table 3 it is evident that US hedge funds exhibit the highest volatility level throughout all 
three time periods, based on the top 10 rankings. This implies that some US hedge funds consist of a higher level of 
risk compared to EU hedge funds, not only during the financial crisis period but also before and after the crisis 
period. These results accentuate the findings of Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999), where hedge funds 
were associated with higher volatility levels compared to market indices. Further results also display that the 
volatility level increased in the equity markets as well, and continued to increase in the CAC 40 and DAX even after 
the financial crisis, but decreased in the S&P 500 and Dow Jones. This emphasise the results found in Table 2, 
where US and EU hedge funds were more correlated with the S&P 500 and Dow Jones during the post-financial 
crisis period. These results, therefore, justify the fact that the S&P 500 and Dow Jones may have been associated as 
markets with a lesser degree of anticipated risk (volatility), making them more desirable during times where markets 
will exhibit extreme noise. 
 
The fourth step of this empirical study is to determine if US or EU hedge funds were the more dominant 
funds over the three time periods, by means of the Sharpe, Sortino, Treynor, Jensen’s alpha, Calmar and Omega 
ratios, respectively. In order to provide a more composite report, the following tables will report the percentage of 
the US and EU hedge funds that were ranked under the top 10 (best 10 performing hedge funds/equity markets). By 
doing so a more comprehensive conclusion can be made, regarding which hedge funds were the more dominant 
performers over the three periods. From the results reported in Table 4 it can be argued, based on the Sharpe, 
Sortino, Calmar and Omega ratio, that more US hedge funds were ranked under the top 10 best performing entities 
during the pre-financial crisis period. The one exception occurs where the Sharpe ratio (using the EU risk-free rate), 
emphasise the performance of the EU hedge funds. Even so, this dominance of the US hedge funds may be 
explained by the fact that US hedge funds were more volatile, based on the results from Tables 2 and 3. These 
results are also corroborated by the results reported in Table 5. It is clear that US hedge funds were able to generate 
a higher level of average cumulative returns during the crisis period and post-financial crisis periods. The EU hedge 
funds display a higher level of average cumulative returns during the pre-financial crisis period though (see Table 
5), which is consistent with the results found by the Sharpe ratio in Table 4. 
 
The results are, however, inconclusive during the crisis period, where the Sharpe and Omega ratios 
reported that EU hedge funds were more dominant under the top 10 rankings, while the Sortino ratio indicates that 
the US hedge funds are dominant. Although Omega and Sortino differ in terms of the top ranked hedge funds, they 
still rank hedge funds over the stock market indices. These findings contradict the findings of Duong (2008), who 
found that hedge funds tend to underperform equity markets when accounting for downside risk with the use of the 
Sortino and Omega ratios. The US and EU hedge funds also exhibit a similar performance during the crisis period 
based on the Calmar ratio’s rankings. 
 
The results for the post-financial crisis period are slightly different in that all the performance ratios 
reported that the US hedge funds were more dominant during the post-financial crisis period. This weaker 
performance of the EU hedge funds can partly be explained by the start of the European sovereign debt crisis in late 
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2009. This period saw a number of downgrades of government debt and rising government and private debt levels in 
some European states, therefore, decreasing investors’ confidence in EU investments. 
 
When assessing the overall picture it is evident that several US and EU hedge funds were able to 
outperform the equity markets during all three time periods. This was confirmed by all the performance measures. 
However, not all the measures placed the same funds in the same positions, a fact that can greatly be ascribed to the 
presence of non-normality in the return distributions. That is why the traditional performance measures, like the 
Sharpe ratio, should be benchmarked with the Omega ratio to overcome its shortcomings. Overall, these results 
contradict the results found by Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) and Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson 
(1999). The results does, however, corroborate the results of Edwards and Caglayan (2001a), who reported that 
hedge funds tend to outperform equity markets in terms of traditional performance ratios, like the Sharpe ratio. 
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Table 4:  Performance Evaluation 
Sharpe Ratio 
Making Use of the EU Risk-Free Rate Making Use of the US Risk-Free Rate 
Percentage of Hedge Funds Under the Top 10 Percentage of Hedge Funds Under the Top 10 
 
Pre-Crisis Period During Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
 
Pre-Crisis Period During Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
EU Hedge Funds 50% 60% 30% EU Hedge Funds 40% 60% 30% 
US Hedge Funds 50% 40% 70% US Hedge Funds 60% 40% 70% 
Ranking of Indices Where One is the Most Superior Ranking of Indices Where One is the Most Superior 
 
Pre-Crisis Period During Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
 
Pre-Crisis Period During Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
CAC 40 39 116 96 CAC 40 38 119 103 
DAX 38 82 63 DAX 39 90 75 
S&P 500 72 118 49 S&P 500 74 122 61 
Dow Jones 110 115 38 Dow Jones 107 117 44 
Sortino Ratio 
Using the EU Risk-Free Rate as Target Rate Using the US Risk-Free Rate as Target Rate 
Percentage of Hedge Funds Under the Top 10 Percentage of Hedge Funds Under the Top 10 
 
Pre-Crisis Period During Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
 
Pre-Crisis Period During Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
EU Hedge Funds 40% 40% 30% EU Hedge Funds 40% 40% 30% 
US Hedge Funds 60% 60% 70% US Hedge Funds 60% 60% 70% 
Ranking of Indices Where One is the Most Superior Ranking of Indices Where One is the Most Superior 
 
Pre-Crisis Period During Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
 
Pre-Crisis Period During Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
CAC 40 44 117 96 CAC 40 57 124 109 
DAX 39 82 60 DAX 58 97 75 
S&P 500 77 112 48 S&P 500 76 118 60 
Dow Jones 108 109 38 Dow Jones 111 125 48 
Omega Ratio 
Using the EU Risk-Free Rate as the Threshold Using the US Risk-Free Rate as the Threshold 
Percentage of Hedge Funds Under the Top 10 Percentage of Hedge Funds Under the Top 10 
 
Pre-Crisis Period During Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
 
Pre-Crisis Period During Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
EU Hedge Funds 30% 60% 30% EU Hedge Funds 30% 60% 30% 
US Hedge Funds 70% 40% 70% US Hedge Funds 70% 40% 70% 
Ranking of Indices Where One is the Most Superior Ranking of Indices Where One is the Most Superior 
 
Pre-Crisis Period During Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
 
Pre-Crisis Period During Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
CAC 40 46 120 99 CAC 40 48 118 99 
DAX 54 91 73 DAX 54 93 74 
S&P 500 78 122 61 S&P 500 78 122 61 
Dow Jones 107 119 44 Dow Jones 105 119 44 
CALMAR RATIO 
  
Percentage of Hedge Funds Under the Top 10 
 
Pre-Crisis Period During Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
EU Hedge Funds 40% 50% 30% 
US Hedge Funds 60% 50% 70% 
Ranking of Indices Where One is the Most Superior 
 
Pre-Crisis Period During Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
CAC 40 45 120 103 
DAX 21 93 75 
S&P 500 67 118 61 
Dow Jones 91 115 43 
+Note that the upper part of the table of each performance measure provides a summary of how many of the 84 US hedge funds, the 38 EU hedge funds, and 4 world indices (a total of 126) ranked under the top 10 best performing 
entities. The bottom part of each performance measure illustrates the rankings of the different equity indices from a total of 126, respectively. Source: Compiled by authors. 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – January/February 2014 Volume 13, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY  181 The Clute Institute 
Table 5:  The Average Cumulative Returns of the Different Hedge Funds 
 
Pre-Crisis Period During Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
EU Hedge Funds  14.31% 1.85% -1.43% 
US Hedge Funds 10.14% 3.52% 3.00% 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
 
Table 6:  Outperformance Evaluation 
Sortino Ratio 
Making Use of the CAC 40 as the Target Rate Making Use of the DAX As the Target Rate 
Percentage of Hedge Funds Under the Top 10 Percentage of Hedge Funds Under the Top 10 
 
Pre-Crisis 
Period 
During Crisis 
Period 
Post-Crisis 
Period  
Pre-Crisis 
Period 
During 
Crisis 
Period 
Post-Crisis 
Period 
Eu Hedge 
Funds 
60% 40% 20% 
Eu Hedge 
Funds 
60% 50% 30% 
Us Hedge 
Funds 
40% 60% 80% 
Us Hedge 
Funds 
40% 50% 70% 
Treynor Ratio 
Using the CAC 40 as the Market Portfolio Using the DAX as the Market Portfolio 
Percentage of Hedge Funds Under the Top 10 Percentage of Hedge Funds Under the Top 10 
 
Pre-Crisis 
Period 
During Crisis 
Period 
Post-Crisis 
Period  
Pre-Crisis 
Period 
During Crisis 
Period 
Post-Crisis 
Period 
Eu Hedge 
Funds 
10% 10% 30% 
Eu Hedge 
Funds 
20% 20% 30% 
Us Hedge 
Funds 
90% 90% 70% 
Us Hedge 
Funds 
80% 80% 70% 
Using the S&P 500 as the Market Portfolio Using the Dow Jones as the Market Portfolio 
Percentage of Hedge Funds Under the Top 10 Percentage of Hedge Funds Under the Top 10 
 
Pre-Crisis 
Period 
During Crisis 
Period 
Post-Crisis 
Period  
Pre-Crisis 
Period 
During Crisis 
Period 
Post-Crisis 
Period 
Eu Hedge 
Funds 
40% 20% 20% 
Eu Hedge 
Funds 
40% 30% 20% 
Us Hedge 
Funds 
60% 80% 80% 
Us Hedge 
Funds 
60% 70% 80% 
Jensen's Alpha 
Using the CAC 40 as the Market Portfolio Using the DAX as the Market Portfolio 
Percentage of Hedge Funds Under the Top 10 Percentage of Hedge Funds Under the Top 10 
 
Pre-Crisis 
Period 
During Crisis 
Period 
Post-Crisis 
Period  
Pre-Crisis 
Period 
During Crisis 
Period 
Post-Crisis 
Period 
Eu Hedge 
Funds 
80% 40% 30% 
Eu Hedge 
Funds 
80% 60% 40% 
Us Hedge 
Funds 
20% 60% 70% 
Us Hedge 
Funds 
20% 40% 60% 
Using the S&P 500 as the Market Portfolio Using the Dow Jones as the Market Portfolio 
Percentage of Hedge Funds Under the Top 10 Percentage of Hedge Funds Under the Top 10 
 
Pre-Crisis 
Period 
During Crisis 
Period 
Post-Crisis 
Period  
Pre-Crisis 
Period 
During Crisis 
Period 
Post-Crisis 
Period 
Eu Hedge 
Funds 
10% 50% 50% 
Eu Hedge 
Funds 
10% 60% 60% 
Us Hedge 
Funds 
90% 50% 50% 
Us Hedge 
Funds 
90% 40% 40% 
+Note that the upper part of the table of each performance measure provides a summary of how many of the 84 US hedge funds, the 38 EU hedge 
funds, and 4 world indices (a total of 126) ranked under the top 10 entities. Source: Compiled by authors. 
 
In order to check the robustness of the results, in terms of the presence of outperformance, the Sortino ratio 
was estimated with the CAC 40 and DAX as target rates, respectively. This approach was also followed in the 
estimation of the Treynor ratio and the Jensen’s alpha, where all four equity markets were used as the market 
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portfolio, respectively. The results from Table 6 emphasise that several US and EU hedge funds were able to 
outperform the equity markets during all three time periods. Based on the results of the Sortino ratio, EU hedge 
funds were able to outperform the CAC 40 and the DAX more frequently than US hedge funds could during the pre-
financial crisis period. Several EU hedge funds also outperformed the DAX during the crisis period. These results 
were also confirmed by Jensen’s alpha, reporting that EU hedge funds outperformed the CAC 40 more often than 
the US hedge funds during the pre-financial crisis period and outperformed the DAX more often than the US hedge 
funds during the pre-crisis and crisis periods. However, Jensen’s alpha also reported similar performance for both 
US and EU hedge funds, where they exhibit similar performance in outperforming the S&P 500 during the crisis and 
post-financial crisis periods. Evidence from Table 6 further shows that EU hedge funds were able to outperform the 
Dow Jones more often than US hedge funds during the crisis and post-financial crisis periods. 
 
From the remaining results reported by the Sortino ratio and Jensen’s alpha, it is confirmed that US hedge 
funds were able to outperform the CAC 40 and the DAX more often than EU hedge funds. These findings were 
further stressed by the results of the Treynor ratio, where the US hedge funds exhibit greater incidence of 
outperforming all the equity markets during all three time periods than EU hedge funds did. From these results it is 
conclusive that although US hedge funds exhibited a higher level of volatility throughout the three time periods, 
they were also more likely to illustrate greater overall performance than EU hedge funds and equity markets. The 
results from Table 6 also illustrates that hedge funds were able to outperform their associated equity markets during 
both a bearish and bullish phase. The results from this study, therefore, emphasise the ability of hedge funds to use 
its investment flexibility during different financial environments to outperform equity markets, thus making hedge 
funds the more superior investment vehicle. 
 
4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Conflicting evidence regarding the performance of hedge funds and their persistence in outperforming 
other markets have been debated by a number of previous studies. Generally, it is assumed that due to the flexibility 
of hedge funds, in being able to apply different investment strategies, will make them the more considered 
unconventional asset choice. However, previous research seems to suggest that hedge funds tend to be correlated 
with equity markets, implying the possibility of hedge funds underperforming during bearish phases. The relatively 
high attrition rate among hedge funds coupled with their non-normally distributed returns (exhibiting high kurtosis 
and negative skewness), makes it also difficult to provide a detailed performance evaluation of all the hedge funds. 
 
Since non-normal distributions were also present in this study, all risk-adjusted performance results were 
benchmarked to the Omega ratio, in an attempt to overcome most of the shortcomings of traditional performance 
measures. From the results if was evident that several US and EU hedge funds were able to outperform the CAC 40, 
the DAX, the S&P 500, and the Dow Jones during both a bearish and bullish phase. Also, although the US hedge 
funds illustrated greater volatility compared to EU hedged funds, evidence from the risk-adjusted performance 
measures supported the overall dominance of US hedge funds. These findings further emphasised that a normal buy-
and-hold strategy on the four world equity indices under investigation, would have been overshadowed by the 
performance of the US and EU hedge funds despite a higher correlation between the hedge funds and the Dow Jones 
and S&P 500 after the financial crisis period. 
 
These results pose a number of further questions. The first is whether different data frequencies will render 
different results. It would also be interesting to look at the level of cost and resource allocation efficiency of hedge 
funds when compared to other investment vehicles. Further research is also required on US and EU hedge funds’ 
ability to time the market. It would also be interesting to draw a risk-weighted returns comparison between these 
hedge funds and mutual funds, since mutual funds are often viewed as ‘safe’ investment vehicles. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A:  Average Correlation of EU Hedge Funds with the US Hedge Funds 
Pre-Financial Crisis Period During-Financial Crisis Period Post-Financial Crisis Period 
EU Hedge Fund 1 0.369 EU Hedge Fund 1 0.479 EU Hedge Fund 1 0.394 
EU Hedge Fund 2 0.373 EU Hedge Fund 2 0.484 EU Hedge Fund 2 0.395 
EU Hedge Fund 3 0.313 EU Hedge Fund 3 0.438 EU Hedge Fund 3 0.465 
EU Hedge Fund 4 0.319 EU Hedge Fund 4 0.439 EU Hedge Fund 4 0.478 
EU Hedge Fund 5 0.338 EU Hedge Fund 5 0.501 EU Hedge Fund 5 0.410 
EU Hedge Fund 6 0.342 EU Hedge Fund 6 0.501 EU Hedge Fund 6 0.414 
EU Hedge Fund 7 0.346 EU Hedge Fund 7 0.500 EU Hedge Fund 7 0.412 
EU Hedge Fund 8 0.107 EU Hedge Fund 8 -0.082 EU Hedge Fund 8 0.122 
EU Hedge Fund 9 0.280 EU Hedge Fund 9 0.471 EU Hedge Fund 9 0.618 
EU Hedge Fund 10 0.281 EU Hedge Fund 10 0.472 EU Hedge Fund 10 0.609 
EU Hedge Fund 11 0.273 EU Hedge Fund 11 0.343 EU Hedge Fund 11 0.019 
EU Hedge Fund 12 0.367 EU Hedge Fund 12 0.285 EU Hedge Fund 12 0.397 
EU Hedge Fund 13 0.297 EU Hedge Fund 13 0.348 EU Hedge Fund 13 0.075 
EU Hedge Fund 14 0.328 EU Hedge Fund 14 0.518 EU Hedge Fund 14 0.433 
EU Hedge Fund 15 0.334 EU Hedge Fund 15 0.520 EU Hedge Fund 15 0.450 
EU Hedge Fund 16 0.342 EU Hedge Fund 16 0.506 EU Hedge Fund 16 0.449 
EU Hedge Fund 17 0.374 EU Hedge Fund 17 0.480 EU Hedge Fund 17 0.613 
EU Hedge Fund 18 0.358 EU Hedge Fund 18 0.556 EU Hedge Fund 18 0.512 
EU Hedge Fund 19 0.392 EU Hedge Fund 19 0.572 EU Hedge Fund 19 0.586 
EU Hedge Fund 20 0.387 EU Hedge Fund 20 0.510 EU Hedge Fund 20 0.618 
EU Hedge Fund 21 0.267 EU Hedge Fund 21 0.155 EU Hedge Fund 21 0.312 
EU Hedge Fund 22 -0.100 EU Hedge Fund 22 -0.068 EU Hedge Fund 22 0.292 
EU Hedge Fund 23 -0.091 EU Hedge Fund 23 -0.048 EU Hedge Fund 23 0.281 
EU Hedge Fund 24 0.350 EU Hedge Fund 24 0.575 EU Hedge Fund 24 0.509 
EU Hedge Fund 25 0.247 EU Hedge Fund 25 0.358 EU Hedge Fund 25 0.625 
EU Hedge Fund 26 0.395 EU Hedge Fund 26 0.480 EU Hedge Fund 26 0.259 
EU Hedge Fund 27 0.410 EU Hedge Fund 27 0.479 EU Hedge Fund 27 0.243 
EU Hedge Fund 28 0.393 EU Hedge Fund 28 0.478 EU Hedge Fund 28 0.259 
EU Hedge Fund 29 0.299 EU Hedge Fund 29 0.099 EU Hedge Fund 29 0.162 
EU Hedge Fund 30 0.299 EU Hedge Fund 30 0.058 EU Hedge Fund 30 0.161 
EU Hedge Fund 31 0.467 EU Hedge Fund 31 0.543 EU Hedge Fund 31 0.463 
EU Hedge Fund 32 0.432 EU Hedge Fund 32 0.578 EU Hedge Fund 32 0.454 
EU Hedge Fund 33 0.112 EU Hedge Fund 33 -0.153 EU Hedge Fund 33 -0.301 
EU Hedge Fund 34 0.257 EU Hedge Fund 34 0.306 EU Hedge Fund 34 0.410 
EU Hedge Fund 35 0.256 EU Hedge Fund 35 0.312 EU Hedge Fund 35 0.408 
EU Hedge Fund 36 0.254 EU Hedge Fund 36 0.305 EU Hedge Fund 36 0.409 
EU Hedge Fund 37 0.123 EU Hedge Fund 37 0.368 EU Hedge Fund 37 0.248 
EU Hedge Fund 38 0.144 EU Hedge Fund 38 0.381 EU Hedge Fund 38 0.294 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
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Table B:  Average Correlation of EU Hedge Funds with the Other EU Hedge Funds 
Pre-Financial Crisis Period During-Financial Crisis Period Post-Financial Crisis Period 
EU Hedge Fund 1 0.637 EU Hedge Fund 1 0.537 EU Hedge Fund 1 0.429 
EU Hedge Fund 2 0.634 EU Hedge Fund 2 0.541 EU Hedge Fund 2 0.426 
EU Hedge Fund 3 0.591 EU Hedge Fund 3 0.480 EU Hedge Fund 3 0.472 
EU Hedge Fund 4 0.588 EU Hedge Fund 4 0.476 EU Hedge Fund 4 0.482 
EU Hedge Fund 5 0.541 EU Hedge Fund 5 0.498 EU Hedge Fund 5 0.465 
EU Hedge Fund 6 0.543 EU Hedge Fund 6 0.497 EU Hedge Fund 6 0.464 
EU Hedge Fund 7 0.546 EU Hedge Fund 7 0.496 EU Hedge Fund 7 0.465 
EU Hedge Fund 8 0.227 EU Hedge Fund 8 -0.042 EU Hedge Fund 8 0.112 
EU Hedge Fund 9 0.593 EU Hedge Fund 9 0.515 EU Hedge Fund 9 0.539 
EU Hedge Fund 10 0.578 EU Hedge Fund 10 0.513 EU Hedge Fund 10 0.535 
EU Hedge Fund 11 0.459 EU Hedge Fund 11 0.335 EU Hedge Fund 11 0.165 
EU Hedge Fund 12 0.590 EU Hedge Fund 12 0.300 EU Hedge Fund 12 0.303 
EU Hedge Fund 13 0.547 EU Hedge Fund 13 0.333 EU Hedge Fund 13 0.198 
EU Hedge Fund 14 0.591 EU Hedge Fund 14 0.521 EU Hedge Fund 14 0.467 
EU Hedge Fund 15 0.588 EU Hedge Fund 15 0.523 EU Hedge Fund 15 0.478 
EU Hedge Fund 16 0.583 EU Hedge Fund 16 0.518 EU Hedge Fund 16 0.476 
EU Hedge Fund 17 0.548 EU Hedge Fund 17 0.471 EU Hedge Fund 17 0.476 
EU Hedge Fund 18 0.593 EU Hedge Fund 18 0.539 EU Hedge Fund 18 0.412 
EU Hedge Fund 19 0.606 EU Hedge Fund 19 0.551 EU Hedge Fund 19 0.524 
EU Hedge Fund 20 0.518 EU Hedge Fund 20 0.502 EU Hedge Fund 20 0.489 
EU Hedge Fund 21 0.546 EU Hedge Fund 21 0.219 EU Hedge Fund 21 0.226 
EU Hedge Fund 22 0.036 EU Hedge Fund 22 -0.070 EU Hedge Fund 22 0.205 
EU Hedge Fund 23 0.039 EU Hedge Fund 23 -0.050 EU Hedge Fund 23 0.199 
EU Hedge Fund 24 0.578 EU Hedge Fund 24 0.577 EU Hedge Fund 24 0.386 
EU Hedge Fund 25 0.338 EU Hedge Fund 25 0.372 EU Hedge Fund 25 0.516 
EU Hedge Fund 26 0.595 EU Hedge Fund 26 0.476 EU Hedge Fund 26 0.391 
EU Hedge Fund 27 0.584 EU Hedge Fund 27 0.476 EU Hedge Fund 27 0.383 
EU Hedge Fund 28 0.597 EU Hedge Fund 28 0.475 EU Hedge Fund 28 0.391 
EU Hedge Fund 29 0.497 EU Hedge Fund 29 0.178 EU Hedge Fund 29 0.272 
EU Hedge Fund 30 0.507 EU Hedge Fund 30 0.154 EU Hedge Fund 30 0.274 
EU Hedge Fund 31 0.640 EU Hedge Fund 31 0.509 EU Hedge Fund 31 0.529 
EU Hedge Fund 32 0.656 EU Hedge Fund 32 0.558 EU Hedge Fund 32 0.518 
EU Hedge Fund 33 0.421 EU Hedge Fund 33 -0.156 EU Hedge Fund 33 -0.263 
EU Hedge Fund 34 0.457 EU Hedge Fund 34 0.331 EU Hedge Fund 34 0.351 
EU Hedge Fund 35 0.457 EU Hedge Fund 35 0.336 EU Hedge Fund 35 0.349 
EU Hedge Fund 36 0.455 EU Hedge Fund 36 0.331 EU Hedge Fund 36 0.349 
EU Hedge Fund 37 0.145 EU Hedge Fund 37 0.316 EU Hedge Fund 37 0.277 
EU Hedge Fund 38 0.154 EU Hedge Fund 38 0.321 EU Hedge Fund 38 0.301 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
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Table C:  Average Correlation of US Hedge Funds with the Other US Hedge Funds 
Pre-Financial Crisis Period During-Financial Crisis Period Post-Financial Crisis Period 
US Hedge Fund 1 0.282 US Hedge Fund 1 0.512 US Hedge Fund 1 0.618 
US Hedge Fund 2 0.326 US Hedge Fund 2 0.482 US Hedge Fund 2 0.616 
US Hedge Fund 3 0.533 US Hedge Fund 3 0.610 US Hedge Fund 3 0.608 
US Hedge Fund 4 0.139 US Hedge Fund 4 0.504 US Hedge Fund 4 0.616 
US Hedge Fund 5 0.235 US Hedge Fund 5 0.573 US Hedge Fund 5 0.676 
US Hedge Fund 6 0.241 US Hedge Fund 6 0.545 US Hedge Fund 6 0.672 
US Hedge Fund 7 0.448 US Hedge Fund 7 0.570 US Hedge Fund 7 0.660 
US Hedge Fund 8 0.448 US Hedge Fund 8 0.573 US Hedge Fund 8 0.659 
US Hedge Fund 9 0.460 US Hedge Fund 9 0.525 US Hedge Fund 9 0.555 
US Hedge Fund 10 0.410 US Hedge Fund 10 0.498 US Hedge Fund 10 0.541 
US Hedge Fund 11 0.320 US Hedge Fund 11 0.458 US Hedge Fund 11 0.318 
US Hedge Fund 12 -0.163 US Hedge Fund 12 0.077 US Hedge Fund 12 -0.277 
US Hedge Fund 13 0.329 US Hedge Fund 13 0.594 US Hedge Fund 13 0.631 
US Hedge Fund 14 0.511 US Hedge Fund 14 0.471 US Hedge Fund 14 0.605 
US Hedge Fund 15 0.509 US Hedge Fund 15 0.470 US Hedge Fund 15 0.604 
US Hedge Fund 16 0.460 US Hedge Fund 16 0.570 US Hedge Fund 16 0.621 
US Hedge Fund 17 0.183 US Hedge Fund 17 0.558 US Hedge Fund 17 0.556 
US Hedge Fund 18 0.336 US Hedge Fund 18 0.347 US Hedge Fund 18 0.660 
US Hedge Fund 19 0.493 US Hedge Fund 19 0.552 US Hedge Fund 19 0.592 
US Hedge Fund 20 0.441 US Hedge Fund 20 0.536 US Hedge Fund 20 0.521 
US Hedge Fund 21 0.335 US Hedge Fund 21 0.462 US Hedge Fund 21 0.675 
US Hedge Fund 22 0.244 US Hedge Fund 22 0.473 US Hedge Fund 22 0.563 
US Hedge Fund 23 0.422 US Hedge Fund 23 0.516 US Hedge Fund 23 0.615 
US Hedge Fund 24 0.367 US Hedge Fund 24 0.570 US Hedge Fund 24 0.419 
US Hedge Fund 25 0.412 US Hedge Fund 25 0.509 US Hedge Fund 25 0.529 
US Hedge Fund 26 0.413 US Hedge Fund 26 0.506 US Hedge Fund 26 0.527 
US Hedge Fund 27 0.414 US Hedge Fund 27 0.517 US Hedge Fund 27 0.533 
US Hedge Fund 28 0.408 US Hedge Fund 28 0.523 US Hedge Fund 28 0.282 
US Hedge Fund 29 0.539 US Hedge Fund 29 0.591 US Hedge Fund 29 0.673 
US Hedge Fund 30 0.385 US Hedge Fund 30 0.312 US Hedge Fund 30 0.650 
US Hedge Fund 31 0.394 US Hedge Fund 31 0.419 US Hedge Fund 31 0.561 
US Hedge Fund 32 -0.035 US Hedge Fund 32 0.008 US Hedge Fund 32 0.325 
US Hedge Fund 33 0.518 US Hedge Fund 33 0.538 US Hedge Fund 33 0.547 
US Hedge Fund 34 0.528 US Hedge Fund 34 0.606 US Hedge Fund 34 0.679 
US Hedge Fund 35 0.544 US Hedge Fund 35 0.536 US Hedge Fund 35 0.674 
US Hedge Fund 36 0.425 US Hedge Fund 36 0.462 US Hedge Fund 36 0.464 
US Hedge Fund 37 0.341 US Hedge Fund 37 0.501 US Hedge Fund 37 0.560 
US Hedge Fund 38 0.379 US Hedge Fund 38 0.494 US Hedge Fund 38 0.552 
US Hedge Fund 39 0.467 US Hedge Fund 39 0.487 US Hedge Fund 39 0.616 
US Hedge Fund 40 0.431 US Hedge Fund 40 0.547 US Hedge Fund 40 0.129 
US Hedge Fund 41 0.301 US Hedge Fund 41 0.211 US Hedge Fund 41 0.624 
US Hedge Fund 42 0.301 US Hedge Fund 42 0.210 US Hedge Fund 42 0.624 
US Hedge Fund 43 0.302 US Hedge Fund 43 0.220 US Hedge Fund 43 0.625 
US Hedge Fund 44 0.406 US Hedge Fund 44 0.159 US Hedge Fund 44 -0.298 
US Hedge Fund 45 0.320 US Hedge Fund 45 0.464 US Hedge Fund 45 0.436 
US Hedge Fund 46 0.008 US Hedge Fund 46 0.299 US Hedge Fund 46 0.365 
US Hedge Fund 47 0.025 US Hedge Fund 47 0.299 US Hedge Fund 47 0.365 
US Hedge Fund 48 0.446 US Hedge Fund 48 0.348 US Hedge Fund 48 0.582 
US Hedge Fund 49 0.321 US Hedge Fund 49 0.313 US Hedge Fund 49 0.578 
US Hedge Fund 50 0.512 US Hedge Fund 50 0.571 US Hedge Fund 50 0.662 
US Hedge Fund 51 0.321 US Hedge Fund 51 0.312 US Hedge Fund 51 0.578 
US Hedge Fund 52 0.483 US Hedge Fund 52 0.585 US Hedge Fund 52 0.680 
US Hedge Fund 53 0.519 US Hedge Fund 53 0.588 US Hedge Fund 53 0.677 
US Hedge Fund 54 0.515 US Hedge Fund 54 0.605 US Hedge Fund 54 0.672 
US Hedge Fund 55 0.542 US Hedge Fund 55 0.596 US Hedge Fund 55 0.675 
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Table C cont. 
US Hedge Fund 56 0.338 US Hedge Fund 56 0.489 US Hedge Fund 56 0.679 
US Hedge Fund 57 -0.115 US Hedge Fund 57 0.050 US Hedge Fund 57 -0.064 
US Hedge Fund 58 0.352 US Hedge Fund 58 0.375 US Hedge Fund 58 0.279 
US Hedge Fund 59 0.448 US Hedge Fund 59 0.565 US Hedge Fund 59 0.570 
US Hedge Fund 60 0.415 US Hedge Fund 60 0.426 US Hedge Fund 60 0.328 
US Hedge Fund 61 0.415 US Hedge Fund 61 0.420 US Hedge Fund 61 0.325 
US Hedge Fund 62 0.418 US Hedge Fund 62 0.416 US Hedge Fund 62 0.303 
US Hedge Fund 63 0.422 US Hedge Fund 63 0.429 US Hedge Fund 63 0.331 
US Hedge Fund 64 0.045 US Hedge Fund 64 0.351 US Hedge Fund 64 0.358 
US Hedge Fund 65 0.062 US Hedge Fund 65 0.348 US Hedge Fund 65 0.347 
US Hedge Fund 66 0.516 US Hedge Fund 66 0.540 US Hedge Fund 66 0.661 
US Hedge Fund 67 0.467 US Hedge Fund 67 0.463 US Hedge Fund 67 0.504 
US Hedge Fund 68 0.271 US Hedge Fund 68 0.223 US Hedge Fund 68 0.420 
US Hedge Fund 69 0.452 US Hedge Fund 69 0.348 US Hedge Fund 69 0.529 
US Hedge Fund 70 0.353 US Hedge Fund 70 0.149 US Hedge Fund 70 0.385 
US Hedge Fund 71 0.355 US Hedge Fund 71 0.152 US Hedge Fund 71 0.385 
US Hedge Fund 72 0.489 US Hedge Fund 72 0.537 US Hedge Fund 72 0.650 
US Hedge Fund 73 0.422 US Hedge Fund 73 0.542 US Hedge Fund 73 0.680 
US Hedge Fund 74 0.409 US Hedge Fund 74 0.356 US Hedge Fund 74 0.545 
US Hedge Fund 75 0.413 US Hedge Fund 75 0.357 US Hedge Fund 75 0.547 
US Hedge Fund 76 0.434 US Hedge Fund 76 0.561 US Hedge Fund 76 0.639 
US Hedge Fund 77 0.205 US Hedge Fund 77 0.508 US Hedge Fund 77 0.603 
US Hedge Fund 78 0.262 US Hedge Fund 78 0.425 US Hedge Fund 78 0.521 
US Hedge Fund 79 -0.085 US Hedge Fund 79 -0.251 US Hedge Fund 79 -0.090 
US Hedge Fund 80 0.343 US Hedge Fund 80 0.482 US Hedge Fund 80 0.615 
US Hedge Fund 81 0.474 US Hedge Fund 81 0.482 US Hedge Fund 81 0.642 
US Hedge Fund 82 0.525 US Hedge Fund 82 0.537 US Hedge Fund 82 0.652 
US Hedge Fund 83 0.523 US Hedge Fund 83 0.536 US Hedge Fund 83 0.651 
US Hedge Fund 84 -0.014 US Hedge Fund 84 -0.070 US Hedge Fund 84 -0.198 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
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